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Este documento evalúa empíricamente la contribución de variables macroeconómicas e 
institucionales en la determinación de la probabilidad de elegir el régimen de metas de 
inflación en una muestra de países que siguen dicho esquema y que comprende el 
periodo que va de 1975 a 2005. Se encuentra que la inflación, el desarrollo financiero, el 
PIB per cápita y la apertura financiera explican tal decisión a través de la estimación de 
modelos de elección discreta para datos de panel. Además, los resultados de este trabajo 
sugieren que las condiciones iniciales al momento de la adopción del esquema 
monetario en cuestión importan ya que los países difieren en la probabilidad predicha de 
adoptar el régimen, lo que, a su vez, es resultado de sus fundamentales 







This paper assesses empirically the contribution of key macroeconomic and institutional 
variables in shaping the likelihood of choosing the Inflation Targeting (IT) regime in a 
sample that comprises countries working under such a regime and covers the period 
1975-2005. I find inflation rate, financial development, GDP per capita and trade 
openness relevant for driving the choice of IT by estimating a discrete choice panel data 
model. Also, my results suggest that the initial conditions at the moment of IT adoption 
do matter because countries have different exposure to the likelihood of choosing IT as 
a result of their specific macroeconomic and institutional fundamentals and 
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Banco Central de Chile 1 Introduction and Motivation
Throughout history, central banks have conducted their monetary policies according to needs
and conditions of their economies, sometimes by monitoring monetary aggregates, sometimes
by a®ecting the evolution of the nominal exchange rate. Nowadays, it is well known that the
main focus of monetary policy should be attaining low, stable in°ation, as deviating from this
objective has serious stability growth and welfare costs (Kydland and Prescott (1977)).
The IT regime is a young monetary policy scheme that emerged in the early 1990s as a
monetary regime truly involved with the in°ation objective in both the academic and political
realms. Since its adoption by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990, an increasing number of
central banks has found in IT an e®ective institutional arrangement for guiding private agents'
expectations, improving tools for communicating policy actions, and thus, enhancing monetary
policy credibility.
Central banks working under the IT regime announce in°ation targets for the horizon they
consider the most proper taking into account the lags with which monetary policy a®ects in°a-
tion and their preferences about the short-run tradeo® between output and in°ation (see Gredig
et al. (2007)). The role of monetary policy consists in anchoring private expectations to the
target having some °exibility for doing so, and monitoring directly these expectations as the
intermediate instrument in the policy framework. Indeed, the transparency on how monetary
policy operates under IT makes the formation of in°ation expectations easier, thereby strength-
ening the ability of central banks to achieve in°ation targets, and therefore, prompting other
central banks to mimic this practice.
Some preconditions, however, should be met in order to successfully implement such a regime.
Remarkable experiences with the IT regime in place in early countries (e.g., New Zealand,
Chile, Canada, United Kingdom) have served as examples for some authors (e.g., Masson et al.
(1997), Mishkin and Savastano (2002); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002)) to propose gen-
eral institutional and macroeconomic requisites central banks should observe in advance. This
regime performs well if implemented by highly independent central banks, and by countries
with balanced and sustainable ¯scal accounts and sane and sound ¯nancial markets. These
preconditions summarize the idea of a central bank that has no excuse|coming from a govern-
ment with a weak capacity for self-¯nancing or the need for bailouts in the ¯nancial system|to
abandon its quality of conducting an independent monetary policy. But many of the latter
preconditions are not met today even by many middle-income developing countries. Actually,
Batini and Laxton (2007), contradicting the preceding literature, show that most in°ation tar-
geters (ITers for short)|including most industrial-country ITers|were far from satisfying the
latter preconditions at the time they started IT. Most ITers, however, improved the underlying
1measures gradually after IT adoption, often taking many years before any signi¯cant improve-
ments in economic and institutional conditions.
Yet countries di®er in what they consider as the desired ¯gures for their in°ation environ-
ment, ¯scal stance and ¯nancial situation prior to IT adoption. Figure 2 shows the cross-country
distribution for 25 countries working under IT up to 20051 of measures of macroeconomic
performance|depicted by in°ation rate, government budget balance (surplus) and ¯nancial
development|calculated over three periods: 5 years before the adoption date (pre-period), date
of adoption, and 5 years after the IT adoption date (post-period).2 Visually, for in°ation rate
and ¯scal position there are more di®erences between distributions estimated for the pre-period
and post-period. While in the ¯rst period (see the solid lines in blue) the in°ation distribution
shows a huge dispersion with the presence, apparently, of many modes, in the second period (see
the solid lines in red) that distribution becomes more concentrated around one-digit in°ation
levels. That di®erence with regard to variance also applies for government budget balance, al-
though it is more noticeable when focusing on the ¯fth year after the IT adoption. In this year,
the distribution of government budget balance exhibits a nearly symmetric shape around zero
with lower variance than other periods. In sum, this cross-country heterogeneity in macroeco-
nomic performance leaves unclear a concrete notion for the macroeconomic preconditions listed
above.
The interest for unveiling, from an empirical viewpoint, the determinants that drive the
choice of IT is not new, although it is the strategy undertaken in this paper. Previous studies
di®er in estimation techniques, main speci¯cations, time coverage and country samples; not sur-
prisingly the evidence is inconclusive. But these studies are common in that they are restricted
to the cross-section framework; thus, neglecting the time dimension.
Next I classify the empirical literature by the kind of variables included in the main speci¯-
cation. Gerlach (1991) explores the determinants behind the choice of IT by performing probit
regressions but discarding the macroeconomic preconditions listed above; although the author
controls for some variables deemed as structural, like trade openness and measures of credi-
bility, and some other variables related to the volatility of real shocks. Another strand of the
literature has assessed explicitly the role of the macroeconomic requirements, including Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), Carare and Stone (2006) and, more recently, Hu (2006). Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) use several measures of central bank independence and credibility
as well, using a sample that comprises the last decade and a larger set of countries. Carare
and Stone (2006) test the relevance of more than one dimension for both ¯scal and ¯nancial
preconditions in shaping the likelihood of choosing IT, using also a larger country sample. Fi-
1The list of these countries is shown in table 3.
2See table 4 for a detailed description of these variables.
2nally, Hu (2006) uses a comprehensive data set for his pooled panel regressions, classifying the
variables as economic structure variables|¯scal position, trade openness, external indebtedness,
and ¯nancial depth|economic institutional variables|measures of central bank independence
and a de facto classi¯cation for exchange rate regimes|and control variables like the in°ation
rate and the GDP growth.
Unlike the reviewed literature, in this paper I carry out a comprehensive empirical study
which has the following features. First, by recognizing that the choice of IT is a process involv-
ing continuous evaluation across time, I use the panel data methodology, a useful framework to
control for unobserved country heterogeneity, which is an important issue, as discussed above.
Second, I discuss carefully the econometric estimation approach, presenting some simulation
results that are intended to support the analysis. Third, I perform robustness checks by run-
ning regressions for di®erent speci¯cations. Finally, I use a set of variables covering the key
dimensions of the analysis surrounding the IT adoption evaluation in practice. Note that the
results described in this paper are only valid for comparing IT experiences before and after the
IT adoption. They do not generalize to any country that has no such a regime in place.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section I expose the econometric issues un-
derpinning the empirical strategy. I propose discrete choice models in a panel data framework
(estimated by the Maximun Likelihood Estimator, MLE for short) and explore issues related to
the asymptotic plan, the time series properties of my right-hand-side variables and the poten-
tial endogeneity problems that could arise. In section 3 I perform data analysis in two fronts:
cross and pooled correlation analysis|motivated by the potential presence of collinearity among
regressors|and a variance decomposition analysis for the regressors|which tries to support the
way I choose to estimate panel data discrete choice models. In section 4 I report the results
coming from the main speci¯cation and the robustness checking. Section 5 concludes. Finally,
the results of the Monte Carlo study that is intended to shed some light on the large sample
properties of the MLE under di®erent conditions|discussed in section 2|are displayed in the
Appendix.
2 Econometric Analysis
As I am interested in explaining the likelihood of adopting IT, let yit be a binary variable
whose value depends on a latent variable y¤
it in the following manner:
yit = 1(y
¤
it ¸ 0) (1)




it = ´i + ®yi(t¡1) + x
0
it¯ + "it (2)
´i is the individual e®ect which is supposed to capture any source of unobserved heterogene-
ity, while ® and ¯ are ¯xed and common parameters for all individuals. The in°uence of the
past decisions on the current choice motivates the inclusion of yi(t¡1). In the microeconometric
literature, ® measures choice persistence (true dependence) while ´i represents persistence due
to individual heterogeneity which remains constant through time (spurious dependence). xit is
a set of possible macroeconomic and structural explanatory exogenous variables. Finally, "it
stands for all sources of variation|across individuals and time|I am unable to model.3
I restate the main equation by combining (1) and (2), obtaining:
yit = 1(´i + ®yi(t¡1) + x
0
it¯ + "it ¸ 0): (3)
Equation (1), however, is useful for making clear that the choice of a regime involves a utility
or welfare evaluation. Precisely, y¤
it is the utility indicator which drives country i in time t to
choose IT as the preferred monetary policy framework|relative to the option of not adopting
it|if the chosen framework reports a gain in comparison with the alternative (that is, if y¤
it ¸ 0).
In principle, this dynamic speci¯cation is the most proper to deal with a choice behavior
which assigns to the current evaluation a high weight to the choice made in the past. In practice,
the adoption of a monetary regime entails a complicated and long process of evaluation of
bene¯ts and costs based on the regime's performance dictated by past experience.
But this continuous evaluation does not imply countries make decisions erratically about the
most suitable economic policy. They exhibit, instead, a persistent behavior. A review of the
IT experiences reveals that no country has abandoned it4, a stylized fact that has non-trivial
consequences in my econometric speci¯cation.
Let me explain why this happens with the aid of a simpli¯ed version of (3). For this purpose
consider the following ¯rst-order Markov chain:
yit = 1(´i + ®yi(t¡1) + "it ¸ 0): (4)
This Markovian process has four states. A country must decide between adopting or not adopt-
ing IT after it made a similar decision in the previous period. Hence, the conditional probabili-
ties associated to this process, generally denoted by Pss0 representing the likelihood of transiting
from state s0 to state s, are the following:
3I could include time e®ects in (2), accounting for international shocks such as the oil price shock.
4Spain and Finland abandoned IT in 1998 but as a natural implication of the conformation of the Euro Area.
4P10(yit = 1j´i;®;yi(t¡1) = 0) = F(´i) (5)
P00(yit = 0j´i;®;yi(t¡1) = 0) = 1 ¡ F(´i) (6)
P11(yit = 1j´i;®;yi(t¡1) = 1) = F(´i + ®yi(t¡1)) (7)
P01(yit = 0j´i;®;yi(t¡1) = 1) = 1 ¡ F(´i + ®yi(t¡1)) (8)
where F is the probability distribution assumed for "it. Unfortunately, I do not observe in
my country sample the event whose probability is written in (8). As noted earlier, in my sample,
the probability of abandoning IT|that is, choosing yit = 0 after choosing yi(t¡1) = 1|is certain
an equal to zero. This result makes it unattractive to consider (3) as a plausible speci¯cation.5
Therefore, I shall be concerned only with the probability of adopting IT conditional on the state
of not having it in place in the past. Thus, my main speci¯cation is reduced to:
yit = 1(´i + x
0
it¯ + "it ¸ 0): (9)
One problem related to the sample design remains in the latter setup. As individual e®ects
are constant across time, they perfectly predict the event yit = 0 in the whole time dimension.
That is, countries that choose always not to follow the IT regime (NITers for short, as opposed
to ITers) do not contribute to the analysis.
Next I discuss key issues related to the panel data estimation of (9) which are not addressed
by the existing empirical literature on the choice of IT regimes. The list of these issues follows:
the asymptotic plan, the time series properties of xit, the distribution function assumed for "it,
and the challenges imposed by possible feedback from the choice of IT on the performance of
the right-hand-side variables.
Information available at the individual level (i.e., people, families, ¯rms, banks and so forth)
for more than one period has spurred the development of the panel data methodology in the
last thirty years. In this econometric context, typically, the number of individuals N is larger
than the time dimension T. This explains why the theory of panel data regarding asymptotic
results is proli¯c when assuming N ! 1 and T ¯xed.
By asymptotic plan I mean to the inference the researcher makes about the large sample
properties of data based on the dimensions of the sample available at hand. If N is much larger
than T, the common asymptotic plan used in the microeconometric literature holds. Likewise,
if both dimensions of the panel are large, the most amenable assumption is both N and T ! 1.
The discussion outlined above is important because the asymptotic plan suggests the choice
of the econometric method. When N is large compared to T, the researcher faces the incidental
5Technically speaking, this Markov chain is said to be reducible because one of the states (that of choosing
IT in the previous period) is absorbing.
5parameters problem in the estimation of a model like (9). This concept, owing to Neyman and
Scott (1948), states that the estimation of a large number of individual e®ects compromises the
consistency of the rest of the parameters.6 Indeed, the literature on ¯xed and random e®ects
estimators arise as a consequence of this contribution. The ¯xed e®ects estimator removes the
individual e®ects; the second one estimates the common distribution of the exogenous variables
and the individual e®ects applying simulation-based econometric methods.7
I design my country sample invoking an asymptotic plan that holds for N ¯xed and T large.
Although I know that the MLE is consistent if N ! 1 and T ¯xed or T ! 1, the Monte
Carlo experiments (reported in the Appendix) show that the bias is bearable when T is large
and N is let to be ¯xed at 25 or 30.
Second, MLE, which is the estimator I shall use, rests on the basic assumption of stationarity
for the exogenous variables. But in macroeconomic studies, like the one attempted here, it is
possible for xit to adopt the properties of non-stationary processes. For integrated processes
of xit in the context of discrete choice models, Park and Phillips (2000) show that parameter
estimators have dual rates of convergence, which seems to be a novel ¯nding in the econometric
literature. This means that the MLE estimator, under uncertain conditions, can converge to the
true value at two rates, one of which is faster than the other.8 Obviously, in such a setup, the
asymptotic theory becomes unreliable, giving some room in this paper for applying bootstrap
techniques. Moreover, as I am uncertain about the consequences of departures from that distri-
bution assumption, I carry out a variety of Monte Carlo experiments regarding di®erent choices
for the dimension of the panel data and the time series properties of an arti¯cially generated
independent variable xit (see the Appendix).
Third, to estimate model (9) parametrically, researchers should make an assumption about
the functional form of F, that is, the distribution function followed by "it. It is a well known
result in the econometric literature that a mistakenly assumed distribution function for errors
renders parameter estimates inconsistent. Manski (1975) and Manski (1985) develop the maxi-
mum score estimator that is unrestricted in this regard. One disadvantage, however, is that the
likelihood function is discrete (it is a step function) at the model parameters, making it di±cult
to derive its asymptotic distribution, although its consistency was earlier studied by Manski
6The individual e®ects are the incidental parameters.
7For the ¯xed e®ects estimator see Andersen (1970), Chamberlain (1980) and Honor¶ e and Kyriazidou (2003).
This latter paper extends the Andersen (1970)'s methodology, called the Conditional Logit Estimator, for dy-
namic panel data models. For the techniques used in the estimation of random e®ects models, see Gouri¶ eroux
and Monfort (2002). For a detailed survey of non-linear discrete choice models see Arellano and Honor¶ e (2001)
and Arellano (2003).
8Guerre and Moon (2002) show, for instance, that when the true value of the parameter is zero, the asymptotic
normality distribution still holds.
6(1985). Horowitz (1992) works in the smoothed version of Manski's estimator borrowing ideas
from the literature of density estimation. As it happens in that literature, the performance of
Horowitz's estimator is sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth. In particular, its asymptotic
distribution depends on this parameter.
Early trails using this estimator convinced me that it has low convergence, specially in this
framework in which I jointly estimate ¯ and ´i. The strategy I take as a remedy consists in
assuming various functional forms for the error distribution. I shall use the Logistic and Normal
distributions yielding the so-called logit and probit models.
Finally, another basic assumption with regard to xit is their exogeneity with respect to the
dependent variable. In°ation Targeting is a monetary regime supported by a stable macroeco-
nomic climate and a highly credible central bank, but in turn it also reinforces credibility and
some macroeconomic conditions. For instance, after the adoption of IT, the success in guiding
private expectations and attaining in°ation targets can be the natural explanation for achieving
ex-post low in°ation rates|an assertion that indeed is supported by ample empirical evidence,
see Corbo et al. (2002), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner
(2002), and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), among others. In ¯scal matters, government
could foster policies that guarantee a sustainable and careful management of ¯scal accounts
since under IT the central bank's discretionary lending is no longer available.
In presence of predetermined variables (including the lagged term of the dependent vari-
able, so including model (3)), Arellano and Carrasco (2003) is a promising ¯rst step in the
development of strategies|based on the generalized use of instrumental variables|to deal with
endogeneity. In this paper, I use, instead, a pragmatic approach, using the ¯rst lagged terms of
my (5 years-averaged) right-hand-side variables, which is a usual remedy found in the empirical
literature.9 The choice of 5 years for computing the averages is arbitrary but is intended to
make clear that the choice of a regime is conceived as a long-run decision involving a long period
of evaluation.
3 Empirical model
In this section I give equation (9) a concrete form. To de¯ne the values for yit, I need infor-
mation about the dates of IT adoption. I have used o±cial information found in central banks'
web pages. When this date is not reported explicitly I follow the dates used in previous papers.10
xit = [INFit BGTit FINit GDPit TOPit]0, where the capitalized words stand for in°ation rate,
9Obviously, in an empirical setup such as the one developed here, it is impossible to control for endogeneity
engendered by a rational expectation reasoning.
10See table 3 for alternative adoption dates.
7government budget balance, ¯nancial development, GDP per capita, and trade openness.
A discussion on the expected signs for the estimated values of ¯ follows. Perhaps, the ¯rst
variable policymakers observe prior to adopting IT is the in°ation rate. Masson et al. (1997)
point out that a successful IT implementation needs a low-in°ation environment. Although
Chile and Israel challenge this claim, the general practice seems to ¯rst make some progress in
in°ation stabilization. Hence, I expect in°ation rate to a®ect negatively the likelihood of choos-
ing IT.11 I expect the opposite for government budget balance, ¯nancial development and GDP
per capita. Independent conduct of monetary policy, as another requisite, should be guaranteed
by basic laws forbidding the provision of discretionary lending to the government and reducing
the temptation of running bailouts in the ¯nancial system. Central banks lacking of this institu-
tional capacity are said to be ¯scally and ¯nancially dominated. Thus, a central bank su®ering
from ¯scal or ¯nancial dominance or both is loath to choice IT. As central bank independence
and credibility are clearly broad and qualitative concepts that are hard to measure, I shall rely
on the GDP per capita as an overall indicator of institutional development because an index µ a
la Cukierman (1992) with su±cient time variation is not available. Finally, I assume countries
with high exposure to the best international practices on macroeconomic policies and structural
reforms|measured by trade openness|to be prone to adopt IT.
I assemble data for ITers over the period 1975-2005.12 In addition to the technical problem
regarding the sample design pointed out in section 2, the inclusion of more countries in the
estimation of (9) would be cumbersome for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, I want to
restrict N to be as large as T because I desire estimates to become immune to the incidental
parameters problem. Recall that in addition to ¯ I also estimate ´i.13 Second, my sample of
ITers is already unbalanced|the choice of IT only represents 26%14 of the observations of yit.
With the inclusion of more countries, that is, in a asymptotic plan with N ! 1, the percent-
age of 1 in yit tends to vanish|while the number of ITers remains ¯xed, the number of NITers
becomes larger|thereby making inessential the estimation of (9).
I end this section with a complementary analysis of data in two respects. Commonly, overall
economic development suggests that ¯nancial development, GDP per capita, and trade openness
11I use the normalized in°ation rate, which is the rate of in°ation divided by the latter variable plus 1. I use
this de¯nition in order to mitigate the in°uence of hyperin°ation episodes. For details on the construction and
de¯nition of the rest of the variables, see table 4.
12See the list of countries in table 5.
13One additional gain of working under this setup (in which I estimate ´i) is that I can estimate marginal
e®ects properly, that is, taking into account the individual heterogeneity.
14Discarding government budget balance, which is the most restrictive variable in number of observations,
this percentage increases to 35%. Yet I take the risk of including that variable because of its key role in the IT
adoption likelihood.
8move together, implying that collinearity problems could arise. In table 6, I report pair-wise
correlation coe±cients for all the variables used in this study. I display calculations in two
ways. On one hand, I apply this estimator over time-demeaned variables|getting cross-section
correlations. On the other hand, I carry out the estimations taking the variables in levels and
computing the whole panel (co)variation|obtaining pooled panel correlations. Four results
emerge from that table. First, my dummy variable for the choice of IT is negatively correlated
with the in°ation rate, but positively correlated with the rest of the variables only when ex-
ploiting the whole variation. Second, the pair-wise correlations among ¯nancial development,
GDP per capita, and trade openness are positive and signi¯cant whatever the way of computa-
tion. In order of magnitude, the correlation between ¯nancial development and GDP per capita
comes ¯rst|with a moderate value, therefore not implying a chronic collinearity|followed by
the correlation of the latter variable and trade openness. Third in the list is the correlation
reported by ¯nancial development and trade openness. In addition, I look for some association
between my indirect measures of ¯scal and ¯nancial dominance. As expected, this association
is positive and signi¯cant, although small in magnitude. This result, however, holds only in the
panel dimension. Finally, the in°ation rate is negatively related to the other variables, showing
correlations that are low in magnitude and robust in signi¯cance to both dimensions.
With regard to the second issue, an absent exercise in the panel data empirical literature
is the analysis of variance (ANOVA), by which the total variance is decomposed into variances
calculated across time (within variance) and between individuals (between variance). The use
of panel data models concerned with within variance|the so-called within estimator in linear
models|implicitly assumes that source of variation is the most important. Thus, as a means
of warranting the estimation strategy proposed here, in table 7 I report the ANOVA results
for my right-hand-side variables. In this table, the high contribution of the between variance
for ¯nancial development, GDP per capita and trade openness contrasts to the nearly balanced
contribution in total variance for in°ation rate and government budget balance. This picture
shows that the choice among models focusing on any source of variation is not clear. Conse-
quently, this ¯nding reinforces the econometric strategy taken here in which I exploit the whole
variation by estimating the individual e®ects.15
15Clearly, both the within and between transformations do not apply in non-linear models (e.g., discrete choice
models). Honor¶ e and Kyriazidou (2003) show, however, that the Conditional Logit Estimator, which is the ¯xed
e®ects estimator in discrete choice models, admits a similar interpretation to the one assigned to the within
estimator in linear models.
94 Results
Without an underlying theoretical model, it is di±cult to justify what subset of the exoge-
nous variables (conforming the best model) enters into equation (9). As mentioned above, I
restrict the number of exogenous variables to ¯ve, including macroeconomic and institutional
preconditions, and a structural variable. This set can be considered little. Only one variable in-
cluded in the reviewed literature is not considered in this paper.16 Hu (2006), for instance, uses
data on exchange rate regimes constructed by Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2005) as measures of de facto central bank independence. One problem with this
data, however, is that the classi¯ed observations related to hyperin°ation periods and missing
data on dual markets leave a small fraction of usable data in some countries.17 As my sample
of countries is already small, I prefer to discard this variable.
I estimate all possible models (i.e., 25 ¡ 1) resulting from combinations of these 5 variables.
As I need a criterion to compare the performance of these models, I compute the Akaike, Schwarz
and Hannan-Quinn information criteria.18 Additionally, I calculate the Hochberg (1988)'s mod-
i¯ed Bonferroni p-value bounds for testing multiple hypotheses that all individual parameter
estimates (including individual e®ects) in each model are zero.
The values computed for the information criteria|displayed in tables 8 (logit) and 9 (probit)|
reveals that there is consensus in selecting the best model, which includes all 5 variables (model
31 in the tables). The ordered p-value bounds, reported in table 10, show that all models except
three of them, display multiple statistical signi¯cance.
The latter discussion means that when estimating marginal e®ects, which are the policy
parameters of interest, I shall exploit various sources of the relevant information in shaping the
likelihood of choosing IT.19 Table 11 shows parameter estimates and their respective marginal
16Among the variables I consider as relevant. Shocks variables should not enter, in principle, in the set of
possible explanatory variables because it is hard to believe that transitory events would drive the choice of a
monetary regime, which entails, instead, a balance of bene¯ts and cost in a long horizon.
17Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) classify these episodes separately.
18Recall that these criteria measure the ability of a model to maximize the probability of observing the data,
accounting for the loss of degrees of freedom implied by the estimation of the model parameters. That is,
they sum the contribution to the log-likelihood (a negative value) minus a penalized function that depends
on the number of estimated parameters. That explains why researcher must select the model with the lowest
value of these criteria. These statistics, however, di®er in that unlike the Akaike criterion, the Schwarz and
Hannan-Quinn criteria are consistent (they select the best model as T grows).
19This claim does not mean that ¯ has no interpretation. Indeed, ¯ is the log of the odds ratio, that is, it
measures the in°uence of the exogenous variable on the likelihood of choosing IT relative to the alternative
option.
10e®ects for both the logit and probit estimations for my best model.20 The calculation of the
marginal e®ects is based on the traditional approach by which the expression of the marginal
e®ect is evaluated at average values of the exogenous variables.21 Before referring to the param-
eter estimates, note that I also test for the relevance of ¯xed e®ects using the statistics suggested
by Baltagi (1995) and Gurmu (1996). The null hypothesis is that all ¯xed e®ects are zero (i.e.,
that the true model is a pooled panel model which neglects country heterogeneity). In the four
sets of results|resulting from di®erent speci¯cations and error distributions|discussed below,
it is possible to reject the null, and therefore, validate the model exposed in equation (9).
Next I discuss my baseline results. As expected, both macroeconomic and institutional
preconditions are highly signi¯cant; although, ¯scal position is the exception. It is not fair to
consider this latter result as puzzling because I have not developed a theoretical model, but it
is counterintuitive. Recall that government budget balance is troublesome because of its avail-
ability. Therefore, this result could be the consequence of this fact. In°ation rate, ¯nancial
development, and GDP per capita show the expected signs; and not only the log of odds ratios
are signi¯cant but also the marginal e®ects calculated as discussed above.22 Note that these
results are also robust to the distribution assumed for errors.
Alternatively, table 11 also presents robustness checking results by dropping government
budget balance from the main speci¯cation. Main results remain and indeed the signi¯cance of
some of the marginal e®ects|those for trade openness and GDP per capita|improves, although
all of them lose numerical magnitude when assuming logistic errors. In the probit regressions
the same occurs, except for trade openness and GDP per capita.
Recent empirical ¯ndings in this regard show that the latter results, regarding sign con-
tribution and statistical signi¯cance, are robust to alternative econometric methods (i.e., the
so-called ¯xed and random e®ects estimators).23
Numerically, the in°ation rate has the highest impact on the likelihood of choosing IT, fol-
lowed by trade openness, ¯nancial development, and GDP per capita. This assertion, however,
is misleading. For interpreting properly the marginal contribution of these variables, I do some
back-of-the-envelope calculations only for the baseline logit regression, which I report in table
12. The marginal e®ects are not directly comparable. For instance, a 10% reduction in in°ation
20I tried to estimate these regressions including time e®ects but without success because of numerical problems.
21As is well known, another method consists in averaging individual marginal e®ects computed for each
individual (country).
22p-values are robust to misspeci¯cation. This means that however you assume the incorrect error distribution,
the signi¯cance of the parameter estimates still holds, see White (1982). The standard errors for the marginal
e®ects were calculated using the Delta method. Note that the marginal e®ect estimator is consistent only when
T ! 1 (Carro (2007)), an assumption that holds in this paper.
23See Calder¶ on and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008).
11does not amount to an increase in ¯nancial development of 10% because each change demands
di®erent e®orts from an economic policy view. But I can rest on some stylized facts for making
these results more comprehensible. Hence, a reduction in the in°ation rate from 17% to 5%|a
similar course followed by the Chilean in°ation during the 1990s|increase the probability of
adopting IT by 13%, which is not a meaningless ¯gure if considering other factors. Moreover,
the impact of an increase in the log of GDP per capita by 1.2 seems huge (65.64%), but if taking
into account that this increase accounts for a transition between income categories (from lower-
middle to upper-middle income), it is not surprising. Finally, an increase in trade openness and
¯nancial development by 10 percentage points has a relatively low impact on the likelihood of
choosing IT.
As I said before, my right-hand-side variables are the 5-year-based averages of the variables
discussed above. This choice is arbitrary and for that reason I also estimate the baseline and
alternative regressions using averages based on 3, 4, 6 and 7 years, in tables 13, 14, 15 and 16,
respectively. Two results arise from this exercise. First, interestingly, the numerical magnitude
of marginal e®ects changes in di®erent directions among variables as moving from the regression
that uses the shortest period (3 years) for the estimation of the average values to the regression
using the longest period (7 years). Thus, in logit regressions the marginal contribution to the
likelihood of IT adoption decreases for in°ation rate and GDP per capita, while the opposite
applies for budget balance and ¯nancial development. In the probit regressions, this nearly
monotonic relationship is weak only for GDP per capita. Second, the signi¯cance and sign of
the estimated parameter value associated to budget balance converge to what I expected as a
result of considering more years in the calculation of the averages. In particular, in 7-year-based
estimations, this variable is signi¯cant (although at 10% of signi¯cance) and accompanied by
the expected sign.
Obviously, the numerical values for the log of odds ratios and the marginal e®ects di®er
across tables|because a 3-year-based variable is qualitatively di®erent from a 7-year-based
variable|and this should not be interpreted as a lack of robustness.
As an another robustness check I tried to estimate both speci¯cations|with and without
government budget balance|using alternative dates of IT adoption (corresponding to the sta-
tionary (ST) and fully-°edged (FF) periods), shown in table 3, but without success. Speci¯cally,
I encountered numerical problems probably arising from a fairly unbalanced dependent variable.
That is, with the alternative dates the percentage of number 1 in yit declines to 18% (25%) and
22% (30%), respectively, including (dropping) government budget balance.
Now let me come back to the discussion on marginal e®ects. I said that their estimation
follows the traditional approach. Nevertheless, this method rests on the assumption that the
distribution of marginal e®ects has a symmetric behavior and one mode. The use of the median
12instead of the mean could arise as a solution for the ¯rst issue; but the second issue is more
di±cult to deal with. To overcome the shortcomings associated to representative statistics, I
estimate the sample density of the marginal e®ects. As in ¯gure 2, I display in ¯gure 3 the
cross-country distribution of the marginal e®ects computed in the pre-period, the starting date,
and the post-period.24 Also, I show the associated predicted probabilities of adopting IT across
time and for each country in ¯gures 4-7.
Cross-country distributions in the pre-period (see the blue lines) try to mimic the shape of
the distribution estimated in the date of adoption as moving across the horizon. Note that even
this distribution is asymmetric (right biased) as shown by the green line. Then, post-period
distributions show an asymmetric shape like the one exhibited by pre-period distributions. This
result is consistent with what I expected a priori given the trending behavior of the majority
of my right-hand-side variables. Marginal contributions to the likelihood of choosing IT should
increase before the starting date while they should decrease during the post-period. Once coun-
tries adopt IT, marginal e®ects of the key macroeconomic and institutional preconditions, found
relevant empirically in this paper, should be lower|because there is no gain in practice, other
than bene¯ts stemming from reinforcing the regime.
In sum, although the traditional approach for computing marginal e®ects is readily avail-
able, it tends to hide interesting issues about the whole distribution of them. Thus, we have
seen that the preconditions' contribution to the probability of adopting IT is quite heterogenous
among countries and across periods, before and after the adoption date. Although the typical
problem of sample size in density estimation applies in this case (recall that I have 25 countries),
these results are congruent with the relevance of initial conditions|in contrast with ¯ndings of
Batini and Laxton (2007)|at the moment of the adoption, as re°ected by a di®erent exposure
of countries to the likelihood of choosing IT.
5 Conclusions
The in°ation targeting regime has become the monetary policy framework of choice in many
industrial and developing countries. Currently, 28 countries follows this regime. Based on these
experiences it would be informative to know what are the main preconditions they have observed
before adopting a monetary regime based on the announcement of in°ation targets. This is not
an easy task because the empirical literature and the monetary policy practice have shown that
countries di®er in their initial conditions at the time of IT adoption.
24Marginal e®ect of the variable k is computed as ^ ¯k b F(1¡ b F), where b F is the logistic cumulative distribution
function evaluated at the estimated parameter values and ^ ¯k is the associated parameter estimate of variable k.
I report only b F(1 ¡ b F) because this expression is su±cient for shaping the distribution of marginal e®ects.
13The main focus of this paper is to study empirically the main determinants that drive the
choice of IT. By using a novel empirical approach|among those found in the existing literature
on IT regimes|I ¯nd that ¯nancial development, GDP per capita (as a measure of overall
economic development) and trade openness exert a positive contribution to the likelihood of
adopting IT. The in°ation rate a®ects such a likelihood negatively. These results are robust to
di®erent speci¯cations and alternative de¯nitions of the right-hand-side variables. Also, note
that these results are only valid for comparing ITer experiences before and after the IT adoption.
They do not generalize to any NITer.
One issue that is currently at debate is the relevance of the initial conditions at the time of IT
adoption. In contrast to Batini and Laxton (2007), my results suggest that the initial conditions
do matter because countries have a di®erent exposure to the likelihood of choosing IT as a result
of their macroeconomic and institutional fundamentals and unobservable idiosyncratic factors,
possibly correlated with the ¯rst ones.
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176 Appendix
6.1 Monte Carlo Study
I perform Monte Carlo experiments for studying the large sample properties of the MLE
regarding two issues: the size of the panel data and the time series properties of the exogenous
variables. I focus on the ¯rst issue because the cross-section dimension of my sample is not so
long as the one typically employed in the microeconometric literature. My sample comprises
only 25 countries. In addition, because I use macroeconomic time series, T is large compared
with the time dimension usually available in microdata. The second kind of exercises assesses
the role of di®erent forms of time dependence and tries to broaden the scope of the simulation
results reported in Park and Phillips (2000), which are restricted to cross-section regressions.
Consider again the model exposed in (9). I generate 1000 arti¯cial series for the dependent
variable making some assumptions about the distribution followed by 1000 arti¯cial series for
xit and the stochastic error term, "it. In the experiments undertaken here, I assume the above
mentioned error term is distributed logistically.25 For xit, which is a scalar, I consider six cases:
Case 1: xt = ut; ut » N(0;¼
2=3)
Case 2: xt = 0:10 + 0:90xt¡1 + ut; ut » N(0;1)
Case 3: xt = 0:10 + 0:99xt¡1 + ut; ut » N(0;1)
Case 4: xt = xt¡1 + ut; ut » N(0;1)
Case 5: xt = 0:5 + xt¡1 + ut; ut » N(0;1)
Case 6: xt = 0:25t + 0:1xt¡1 + ut; ut » N(0;1)
where, ut is a stochastic term. Also, I allow for correlation between individual e®ects and
the exogenous variable by de¯ning ´i = T ¡1 PT
t=1 xit as in Carro (2007). MLE contemplates
cases 1 to 3, in which xit distributes normally, and follows a persistent and highly persistent
autoregressive process. In addition, xit is set to follow a random walk process without drift
(case 4) and with drift (case 5). Park and Phillips (2000) study case 4 but in a cross-section
framework, showing in a multiple variable setting that the parameter estimators have dual rates
of convergence. The inclusion of the sixth case, in which xit is modeled as a trend stationary
process, gives completeness. Regarding the panel data dimensions, N and T are set equal to
f25,30,50g and f10,20,30,40,50g, respectively. The choice of the parameters in cases 1{6
tries to mimic the time series behavior of my exogenous variables.
25Simulations assuming normally distributed errors were not performed because of time limitations.
18Table 1 and table 2 report the results of the experiments regarding percentage bias (PB)
and root mean squared error (RMSE). The PB is measured as the bias divided by the true
parameter's value while the RMSE is the root of the sum of variance and squared bias. The
¯rst table shows that, in general, the PB of the MLE becomes acceptable as both N and T
grow (about 3% when N = T = 50). The same occurs for the e±ciency of the estimator (see
table 2). I shall focus my attention on table 1. By comparing cases 1, 2 and 3, you see the PB
is greater when xit follows a highly persistence stationary process. A similar conclusion arises
from the comparison of cases 3 and 4; however, in some experiments they tend to exhibit a
similar behavior. Also, the inclusion of drift in the random walk process increases the PB. As
yet, these ¯ndings are linked with those reported by Park and Phillips (2000) in matters of rate
of convergence. I show in addition that when xit is assumed to be a trend stationary process, the
asymptotic properties of MLE are better than those displayed by the random walk processes but
worse than those exhibited by the stationary processes. Curiously, the latter relationship breaks
down when T = 30, as revealed by the comparison between cases 5 and 6, probably re°ecting
the need for more simulations.26 Moreover, you note that PB does not decrease monotonically
as N grows, contradicting what might be expected. Again, N in this paper is much smaller
than the number of individuals found in microeconomic surveys. Hence, it is possible that the
range of values for N considered here were not su±cient for generating more conclusive results
in this regard.
The interesting result, however, is that there is more gain in bias reduction when T grows
than when N grows (compare the results for N;T=f30,50g, see also ¯gure 1). Recall that
my panel data's dimensions are unusual from the perspective of the microeconomic literature.
Although I assume that N is ¯xed, the message of these experiments is that I can rest on the
gains in bias reduction provided by the time dimension.
26Note, however, that the cross-section dimensions considered here are far from being similar to those typically
employed in the microeconomic literature (e.g., N = 500).
19Table 1: Monte Carlo Results: Percentage Bias (%)
Maximun Likelihood Estimation
yit = 1(´i + x0
it¯ + "it ¸ 0)
¯ = ¡1;´i = (1=T)
PT
t=1 xt
Note: ut » N(0;1), except where otherwise stated
Number of experiments=1000
T = 10 T = 20 T = 30 T = 40 T = 50
Case 1: xt » N(0;¼2=3)
N = 25 17.45 7.16 4.32 3.46 2.22
N = 30 16.39 6.73 4.10 3.24 2.55
N = 50 14.87 6.98 4.34 3.19 2.48
Case 2: xt = 0:1 + 0:90xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 14.61 6.65 4.28 3.39 2.54
N = 30 14.12 6.74 4.15 3.63 2.66
N = 50 12.81 6.69 4.54 3.14 2.61
Case 3: xt = 0:1 + 0:99xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 16.16 7.34 4.64 3.94 3.31
N = 30 14.63 7.12 4.70 4.05 3.60
N = 50 13.63 7.67 5.09 3.89 3.28
Case 4: xt = xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 16.34 7.59 4.99 3.92 3.35
N = 30 14.59 7.27 5.04 4.28 3.68
N = 50 13.86 7.66 5.30 4.14 3.36
Case 5: xt = 0:5 + xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 16.35 7.62 4.88 4.23 3.79
N = 30 15.01 7.57 4.92 4.19 3.65
N = 50 13.77 7.73 5.41 4.23 3.45
Case 6: xt = 0:25t + 0:1xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 15.32 6.31 5.59 4.93 4.58
N = 30 14.87 6.87 5.77 4.84 4.54
N = 50 13.02 6.84 5.38 4.80 4.25
20Table 2: Monte Carlo Results: Root Mean Squared Error
Maximun Likelihood Estimation
yit = 1(´i + x0
it¯ + "it ¸ 0)
¯ = ¡1;´i = (1=T)
PT
t=1 xt
Note: ut » N(0;1), except where otherwise stated
Number of experiments=1000
T = 10 T = 20 T = 30 T = 40 T = 50
Case 1: xt » N(0;¼2=3)
N = 25 0.26 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07
N = 30 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.06
N = 50 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.05
Case 2: xt = 0:1 + 0:90xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 0.25 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07
N = 30 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06
N = 50 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05
Case 3: xt = 0:1 + 0:99xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07
N = 30 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07
N = 50 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.06
Case 4: xt = xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07
N = 30 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07
N = 50 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06
Case 5: xt = 0:5 + xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 0.26 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07
N = 30 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07
N = 50 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.06
Case 6: xt = 0:25t + 0:1xt¡1 + ut
N = 25 0.25 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08
N = 30 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
N = 50 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06
21Figure 1: Monte Carlo Results: Distribution of ¯
N = 25;T = f25;50g : cases 1,2,4 and 6 N = 25;T = f25;50g : cases 1,3,5 and 6
N = 30;T = f25;50g : cases 1,2,4 and 6 N = 30;T = f25;50g : cases 1,3,5 and 6
N = 50;T = f25;50g: cases 1,2,4 and 6 N = 50;T = f25;50g : cases 1,3,5 and 6
22Figure 2: Cross-country Distribution of Key Macroeconomic and Institutional
Preconditions for Adopting IT
Cross-country distribution in Cross-country distribution in
ft ¡ 5;:::;t + 5g for in°ation ft ¡ 5;:::;t + 5g for ¯nancial development
Cross-country distribution in Cross-country distribution in
ft ¡ 5;:::;t + 5g for government budget balance ft ¡ 5;:::;t + 5g for (log of) GDP per capita
Cross-country distributions for ft ¡ 5;:::;t ¡ 1g, t, ft + 1;:::;t + 5g in blue (5 years), green (1 year) and red (5 years),
respectively. Horizontal axis: the range of values of the variable, vertical axis: values of the density function estimated
using the Gaussian kernel.
23Figure 3: Cross-country Distribution of b F(1 ¡ b F)
Cross-country distributions for ft ¡ 5;:::;t ¡ 1g, t, ft + 1;:::;t + 5g in blue
(5 years), green (1 year) and red (5 years), respectively. Horizontal axis: the
range of values of the variable, vertical axis: values of the density function
estimated using the Gaussian kernel.
24Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities
¡b F
¢
of Adopting IT for each Country
25Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities
¡b F
¢
of Adopting IT for each Country (continued)
26Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities
¡b F
¢
of Adopting IT for each Country
27Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities
¡b F
¢
of Adopting IT for each Country (concluded)
28Table 3: Starting Dates of IT 2005 according to Di®erent Sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Corbo Fracasso Fraga Levin P¶ etursson Ball and Schaech{ Truman Bernanke Central IT Adoption 2005 in°ation
et. al et. al et. al et. al (2004) Sheridan ter et. al (2003) et. al Bank web dates used here target
(2001) (2003) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2000) (1999) pages (11a) (11b) (11c) level (%)
PP or FF FF ST
AUS 1994 Sep{1994 Apr{1993 1993 Apr{1993 Q4{1994 Jun{1993 Jun{1993 Sep{1994 1993 1993 1993 1994 2{3
BRA 1999 Jun{1999 Jun{1999 Jun{1999 Jun{1999 { Jun{1999 Jun{1999 { Jun{1999 1999 1999 { 4.5 (+/-2.5)
CAN 1991 Feb{1991 Feb{1991 1991 Feb{1991 Q1{92(4) Feb{1991 Feb{1991 Feb{1991 Feb{1991 1991 1991 1995 1{3
CHL 1991 Jan{1991 Jan{1991 Jan{1991 Sep{1990 { Sep{1999 Sep{91/99 { Sep{1990 1991 2000 2001 2{4
COL 1999 Sep{1999 Sep{1999 Sep{1999 Sep{1999 { { Oct{1999 { 1999 2000 2000 { 5 (+/-0.5)
CZE 1998 Jan{1998 Jan{1998 Jan{1998 Jan{1998 { Dec{1997 Dec{1997 { Jan{1998 1998 1998 { 3 (+/-1)
GTM { { { { { { { { { Jan{2005 2005 2005 { 4{6
HUN { Jul{2001 Jun{2001 Aug{2001 Jan{2001 { { Jun{2001 { Jun{2001 2001 2001 { 3.5 (+/-1)
ISL 2001 Mar{2001 Mar{2001 { Mar{2001 { { Mar{2001 { Mar{2001 2001 2001 2003 2.5
IDN { { { { { { { { { Q1{2005 2005 2005 { 6.0 (+/-1)
ISR 1992 Jan{1992 Jan{1992 Jan{1992 Jan{1992 { Jun{1997 Dec/Jun{91/97 Jan{1992 { 1992 1997 2003 1{3
MEX 1999 Jan{1999 Jan{1999 Jan{1999 Jan{1999 { { Jan{95/01 { Jan{2001 1995 2001 2003 3 (+/-1)
NZL 1990 Apr{1988 Mar{1990 1990 Mar{1990 Q3{90(3) Jul{1989 Dec{1989 Mar{1990 { 1990 1990 1993 1{3
NOR 2001 Mar{2001 Mar{2001 2000 Mar{2001 { { Mar{2001 { Mar{2001 2001 2001 2001 2.5
PER 1994 Jan{2002 Jan{1994 Jan{2002 Jan{2002 { { Jan{2002 { Jan{2002 1994 2002 2002 2.5 (+/-1)
PHL { Jan{2002 { Jan{2002 Jan{2002 { { Jan{2002 { Jan{2002 2002 2002 { 5{6
POL 1998 Oct{1998 Oct{1998 Jun{1998 Oct{1998 { Mar{1999 Sep{1998 { Sep{1998 1999 1999 2004 2.5 (+/-1)
ROM { { { { { { { { { Aug{2005 2005 2005 { 7.5 (+/-1)
SVK { { { { { { { { { Q1{ 2005 2005 2005 { 3.5 (+/-0.5)
ZAF 2000 Feb{2000 Feb{2000 Feb{2000 Feb{2000 { Feb{2000 Feb{2000 { Feb{2000 2000 2000 2001 3{6
KOR 1998 Apr{1998 Jan{1998 Apr{1998 Apr{1998 { { Apr{1998 { Apr{1998 1998 1998 1999 2.5{3.5
SWE 1993 Jan{1993 Jan{1993 1995 Jan{1993 Q1{1995 Jan{1993 Jan{1993 Jan{1993 1993 1993 1993 1995 2 (+/-1)
CHE 2000 Jan{2000 Jan{2000 2001 Jan{2000 { { { { { 2000 2000 2000 0{2
THA 2000 May{2000 Apr{2000 May{2000 May{2000 { { May{2000 { May{2000 2000 2000 2000 0{3.5
GBR 1992 Oct{1992 Oct{1992 1992 Oct{1992 Q1{1993 Oct{1992 Oct{1992 Oct{1992 Oct{1992 1993 1993 1993 2
Notes
(1) They follow Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer in classifying the countries, though not always in dating the start of in°ation targeting experiences
(2) They follow Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) except when some central banks suggested other starting dates
(3) Authors' notes: South Africa established the ¯rst in°ation target for 2002
(4) Dates obtained from the ¯gures that show both the in°ation series and the in°ation targets. The dates corresponding to Norway and Switzerland have been obtained from the text
(5) Sources: Fracasso et al. (2003), Truman (2003), P¶ etursson (2004), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Schaechter et al. (2000), and central bank web pages.
(7) Sources: Central banks websites and publications, discussions with central banks and Bernanke and others (1999)
(8) Switzerland was intentionally excluded (by the author) based on the self-declaration as NITer. See Truman (2003) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002)
(11) If the In°ation Targeting adoption date is July or later of any year t, the annual date reported is year t+1
PP=IT partial adoption, FF=IT fully-°edged adoption, and ST=stationary period according to the de¯nition of in°ation targets
2
9Table 4: Determinants of IT Regime Likelihood
Variable Description Source Expected Estimated
signs signs
Normalized ¼=(1 + ¼) WDI (2007) Negative Negative
In°ation rate ¼: CPI in°ation rate
Government Overall Government
budget balance Budget Balance GFS and EIU Positive Positive
(surplus)/GDP
Financial development Domestic credit WDI (2007) Positive Positive
to private sector/GDP
Natural Log
GDP per capita of the GDP WDI (2007) Positive Positive
per capita
Trade openness (X+M)/GDP WDI (2007) Positive Positive
EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit, GFS: Government Financial Statistics, WDI: World Development Indicators.
Table 5: Country Sample according to Income Category
income country group 2 3 4 5
In°ation targeters
Brazil (BRA) Chile (CHL) Australia (AUS) Israel (ISR)
Colombia (COL) Czech Republic (CZE) Canada (CAN)
Guatemala (GTM) Hungary (HUN) Switzerland (CHE)
Indonesia (IDN) Mexico (MEX) United Kingdom (GBR)
Peru (PER) Poland (POL) Iceland (ISL)
Philippines (PHL) Romania (ROM) South Korea (KOR)
Thailand (THA) Slovak Republic (SVK) Norway (NOR)
South Africa (ZAF) New Zealand (NZL)
Sweden (SWE)
2, 3, 4 and 5 stands for lower middle income, upper middle income, high income OECD, and high income non-OECD countries.
30Table 6: Pair-wise Correlation Analysis
Sample Dummy In°ation Budget Financial GDP per Trade
IT rate balance development capita openness
Dummy IT 1 -0.1029* -0.2236* 0.3374* 0.4551* -0.1626*
In°ation rate -0.3265* 1 -0.5247* -0.5427* -0.3363* -0.4453*
Budget balance 0.2433* -0.5179* 1 0.0677 0.0342 0.1193*
Financial development 0.3136* -0.3821* 0.1684* 1 0.6132* 0.2947*
GDP per capita 0.2972* -0.2880* 0.0834 0.5864* 1 0.3268*
Trade openness 0.1467* -0.3309* 0.0857 0.2906* 0.3195* 1
Numbers in the inferior triangle are the pooled correlations across the time and countries (pooled correlations) while
the numbers in the superior triangle are cross correlations across countries (among time-demeaned variables). *
denotes signi¯cance at 5% at maximum.
Table 7: Panel ANOVA Analysis
In°ation Budget Financial GDP per Trade
rate balance development capita openness
Sample: 1975-2005
within variance (%) 0.4480 0.6018 0.2791 0.0537 0.2532
between variance (%) 0.5520 0.3982 0.7209 0.9463 0.7468
Table 8: Model Selection based on Information Criteria: Logit Models
Model
k = 1
1 2 3 4 5
AIC -0.504 -0.874 -0.699 -0.519 -0.893
BIC -0.327 -0.696 -0.522 -0.342 -0.715
HQC -0.435 -0.804 -0.630 -0.449 -0.823
Model
k = 2
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
AIC -0.483 -0.358 -0.326 -0.410 -0.607 -0.482 -0.651 -0.419 -0.603 -0.490
BIC -0.297 -0.172 -0.140 -0.224 -0.421 -0.296 -0.466 -0.233 -0.417 -0.304
HQC -0.410 -0.285 -0.253 -0.337 -0.534 -0.409 -0.578 -0.346 -0.530 -0.417
Model
k = 3
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
AIC -0.352 -0.321 -0.382 -0.261 -0.257 -0.314 -0.394 -0.458 -0.445 -0.379
BIC -0.158 -0.127 -0.188 -0.067 -0.063 -0.120 -0.200 -0.264 -0.251 -0.185
HQC -0.276 -0.245 -0.306 -0.185 -0.181 -0.238 -0.318 -0.382 -0.369 -0.303
Model
k = 4
26 27 28 29 30
AIC -0.255 -0.245 -0.305 -0.216 -0.345
BIC -0.053 -0.043 -0.103 -0.013 -0.143







AIC: Akaike information criterion, BIC: Schwarz informatio criterion, HQC: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. All
models were estimated using the same sample. k denotes the number of variables whose combination produce the models
shown in each column. For example, from k = 2 it is possible to form 10 models.
31Table 9: Model Selection based on Information Criteria: Probit Models
Model
k = 1
1 2 3 4 5
AIC -0.605 -0.878 -0.707 -0.529 -0.894
BIC -0.428 -0.701 -0.529 -0.351 -0.716
HQC -0.536 -0.808 -0.637 -0.459 -0.824
Model
k = 2
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
AIC -0.577 -0.401 -0.402 -0.490 -0.616 -0.487 -0.652 -0.432 -0.605 -0.500
BIC -0.391 -0.216 -0.216 -0.304 -0.430 -0.302 -0.466 -0.246 -0.419 -0.314
HQC -0.504 -0.328 -0.329 -0.417 -0.543 -0.414 -0.579 -0.359 -0.532 -0.427
Model
k = 3
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
AIC -0.396 -0.394 -0.449 -0.309 -0.309 -0.378 -0.406 -0.461 -0.449 -0.394
BIC -0.202 -0.200 -0.255 -0.115 -0.115 -0.183 -0.211 -0.266 -0.255 -0.200
HQC -0.320 -0.318 -0.373 -0.233 -0.233 -0.301 -0.329 -0.384 -0.373 -0.317
Model
k = 4
26 27 28 29 30
AIC -0.305 -0.296 -0.365 -0.265 -0.355
BIC -0.102 -0.094 -0.163 -0.063 -0.153







AIC: Akaike information criterion, BIC: Schwarz informatio criterion, HQC: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. All
models were estimated using the same sample. k denotes the number of variables whose combination produce the models
shown in each column. For example, from k = 2 it is possible to form 10 models.
Table 10: Bonferroni p-value Bounds for the Multiple Non-signi¯cance Hypothesis
Model k = 1 1 2 3 4 5
p-value 0.036 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000
Model k = 2 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
p-value 0.030 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
Model k = 3 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
p-value 0.013 0.449 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.040 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
Model k = 4 26 27 28 29 30
p-value 0.341 0.010 0.044 0.002 0.000
Model k = 5 31
p-value 0.008
Hochberg (1988)' method consists in ordering the p-values from testing m hypothesis as p(1);:::;p(m) and computing
the bound as B = mini2f1;:::;mg(m ¡ i + 1)p(i). All models were estimated using the same sample. k denotes the
number of variables whose combination produce the models shown in each column. For example, from k = 2 it is
possible to form 15 models.
32Table 11: Estimation Results: 5-year-based estimations
Baseline regression Alternative regression
Logit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -28.056 0.040 -1.302 0.006 -29.691 0.039 -1.121 0.006
budget balance 1.799 0.838 0.083 0.879 { { { {
¯nancial development 14.643 0.000 0.679 0.002 14.118 0.000 0.533 0.002
GDP per capita 11.782 0.020 0.547 0.017 13.845 0.006 0.523 0.012
trade openness 19.003 0.001 0.882 0.006 21.684 0.001 0.819 0.003
Ho: ´i = 0 i = 1;:::;N LM test 5965.67 p-value 0.000 LM test 37238.89 p-value 0.000
Probit Regressions parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -8.778 0.008 -1.620 0.000 -9.115 0.006 -1.546 0.000
budget balance 3.620 0.330 0.668 0.497 { { { {
¯nancial development 6.662 0.000 1.230 0.000 6.213 0.000 1.054 0.000
GDP per capita 5.383 0.001 0.994 0.001 6.381 0.000 1.083 0.001
trade openness 7.839 0.000 1.447 0.000 8.734 0.000 1.482 0.000
Ho: ´i = 0 i = 1;:::;N LM test 4113.14 p-value 0.000 LM test 38333.88 p-value 0.000
Estimated individual e®ects not reported.
3
3Table 12: Marginal Contribution of Key Determinants of IT Regime Likelihood
Variable Marginal contribution Measure Impact of :::
a reduction of ¼n in 10 percentage
CPI in°ation rate 13.19% ¼n = ¼=(1 + ¼) points (p.p.) which amounts roughly a
reduction of ¼ from 17% to 5%
Financial development 6.79% ratio an increase of the indicator in 10 p.p.
GDP per capita 65.64% in logs
an increase of the log of GDP in 1.2
per capita which accounts for
passing from 2 (8.1 Indonesia) to
3 (9.3 Poland) in income category
Trade openness 8.82% ratio an increase of the indicator in 10 p.p.
The ¯gures for Indonesia and Poland correspond to averages of the log of GDP per capita computed over the period 2001-2005.
For income categories see table 5.
34Table 13: Estimation Results: 3-year-based estimations
Baseline regression Alternative regression
Logit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -51.159 0.000 -0.367 0.088 -51.900 0.000 -0.389 0.089
budget balance -11.163 0.312 -0.080 0.374 { { { {
¯nancial development 12.141 0.000 0.087 0.108 11.864 0.000 0.089 0.113
GDP per capita 16.184 0.002 0.116 0.094 14.234 0.003 0.107 0.098
trade openness 20.374 0.000 0.146 0.114 21.403 0.000 0.160 0.116
Probit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -18.345 0.000 -1.261 0.003 -18.390 0.000 -1.271 0.003
budget balance -2.088 0.670 -0.143 0.672 { { { {
¯nancial development 5.586 0.000 0.384 0.005 5.551 0.000 0.384 0.005
GDP per capita 5.394 0.002 0.371 0.025 5.108 0.001 0.353 0.024
trade openness 8.948 0.000 0.615 0.006 9.198 0.000 0.636 0.005
Estimated individual e®ects not reported.
3
5Table 14: Estimation Results: 4-year-based estimations
Baseline regression Alternative regression
Logit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -37.868 0.000 -0.896 0.030 -37.838 0.000 -0.922 0.028
budget balance -7.271 0.518 -0.172 0.524 { { { {
¯nancial development 13.041 0.000 0.308 0.037 12.932 0.000 0.315 0.036
GDP per capita 13.637 0.002 0.323 0.049 12.453 0.001 0.303 0.050
trade openness 18.238 0.000 0.431 0.049 19.135 0.000 0.466 0.042
Probit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -11.348 0.000 -1.629 0.000 -11.345 0.000 -1.629 0.000
budget balance -0.105 0.983 -0.015 0.983 { { { {
¯nancial development 5.978 0.000 0.858 0.000 5.976 0.000 0.858 0.000
GDP per capita 5.528 0.001 0.794 0.002 5.515 0.000 0.792 0.001
trade openness 7.812 0.000 1.121 0.000 7.826 0.000 1.124 0.000
Estimated individual e®ects not reported.
3
6Table 15: Estimation Results: 6-year-based estimations
Baseline regression Alternative regression
Logit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -22.377 0.000 -1.569 0.005 -22.996 0.000 -1.617 0.005
budget balance 12.418 0.317 0.871 0.328 { { { {
¯nancial development 16.361 0.000 1.147 0.000 16.156 0.000 1.136 0.000
GDP per capita 10.900 0.007 0.764 0.017 12.517 0.001 0.880 0.005
trade openness 19.462 0.000 1.365 0.003 17.039 0.000 1.198 0.002
Probit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -7.427 0.000 -1.600 0.001 - 8.094 0.000 -1.742 0.000
budget balance 8.510 0.150 1.833 0.157 { { { {
¯nancial development 7.542 0.000 1.624 0.000 7.562 0.000 1.627 0.000
GDP per capita 5.465 0.002 1.177 0.002 6.227 0.000 1.340 0.000
trade openness 8.385 0.000 1.806 0.000 6.919 0.000 1.489 0.001
Estimated individual e®ects not reported.
3
7Table 16: Estimation Results: 7-year-based estimations
Baseline regression Alternative regression
Logit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -17.764 0.000 -1.611 0.007 -20.004 0.000 -1.866 0.004
budget balance 25.364 0.078 2.301 0.092 { { { {
¯nancial development 20.217 0.000 1.834 0.000 19.203 0.000 1.791 0.000
GDP per capita 10.471 0.011 0.950 0.021 13.272 0.001 1.238 0.002
trade openness 21.087 0.001 1.913 0.003 15.618 0.001 1.457 0.005
Probit Regression parameter p-value marginal p-value parameter p-value marginal p-value
estimates e®ects estimates e®ects
CPI in°ation -6.678 0.000 -1.582 0.001 -8.036 0.000 -1.928 0.000
budget balance 15.261 0.035 3.615 0.038 { { { {
¯nancial development 9.482 0.000 2.246 0.000 9.236 0.000 2.216 0.000
GDP per capita 5.366 0.005 1.271 0.006 6.615 0.000 1.587 0.000
trade openness 9.772 0.001 2.315 0.001 6.792 0.002 1.629 0.003
Estimated individual e®ects not reported.
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